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FOREWORD
While clearly a mark of service parochialism, Army
officers are usually surprised when an Air Force Officer
brings forward something in the realm of the theory of war
that addresses anything other than strategic bombing or air
superiority. Yet here is a truly thoughtful monograph that
does just that. The author wrote this when a student at the
U.S. Army War College in academic year 1998-99.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Frost makes it clear that
he is not interested in throwing out the old tried and true
Principles of War, he only wants thought given to their
expansion to include a principle of Flexibility. After all, the
hallmark of the course of instruction at the U.S. Army War
College is the new environment in which its graduates
should expect to operate—an environment that we at the
War College characterize as vague, uncertain, complex and
ambiguous. In such an environment, the author argues,
Flexibility must be an operating principle and it would
serve all the services well to recognize it as such.
Frost begins with a useful review of the development of
the existing principles and on that same basis suggests
inclusion of Flexibility is more than warranted. In this, he
draws upon the Strategic Studies Institute’s earlier review
of the Strategic Principles of War, as well as Robert R.
Leonhard’s work on Principles for Information Age
Warfare, among others.
Frost’s proposed short definition: “to be responsive to
change and adaptable to the volatility, pressures and
complexities of military operations, while constantly
focusing on the objective” reminds us that military
operations are subject to numerous conflicting pressures.
He describes those pressures, now emerging from our
current military operations other than war, in a 21st
century context. Especially in that future context, Frost
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sees a heightened need for adopting Flexibility as a
principle of military operations. Finally, for those wishing to
study the Principles of War further and for a compilation of
salient articles on those and other suggested Principles,
Frost’s endnotes offer a rich source. We commend this study
to your thoughtful attention and debate.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studie Institute
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THE GROWING IMPERATIVE
TO ADOPT “FLEXIBILITY”
AS AN AMERICAN PRINCIPLE OF WAR
I bend but do not break.1
Jean de La Fontaine
Fables, 1668

With those six words, French author Jean de La
Fontaine captures two compelling metaphors which should
not be lost on any warfighter. Resistance to breaking—or, in
essence, resistance to defeat—is so intuitively vital to
success in war that little more needs to be said about the
notion. The ability to bend, on the other hand, may not
strike the American warrior’s intuition with the same
immediacy. It should. For, as this author will show,
flexibility— the ability to “bend” —is a foundational
warfighting attribute which should be embraced and
adopted by the U.S. military community as a principle of
war (or operations 2). Further, due to both evolutionary and
potentially revolutionary forces, the imperative to
incorporate flexibility as a principle of war will only grow as
the United States moves into the 21st century. Those points
represent the thesis of this monograph.
One can rightly ask whether capturing the elusive list of
“true” principles of war—an effort dating to antiquity—
really matters. Some question the 20th century
development of an almost prescriptive, “checklist approach”
to dealing with what many believe to be the essentially
unquantifiable art of winning wars. 3 The answers to those
provocative questions have been debated for decades. More
pragmatically for this monograph’s purposes is this
realization: Adopting and codifying principles of war in
doctrine is a fully institutionalized U.S. military practice,
yielding an attendant influence on American military Joint
and Service cultures. The risk of misinterpreting or
1

misapplying the principles is accepted by the institution,
given the perceived benefits. Given this policy, however, two
things become crucial. One, the collective list of principles
must be free of any significant conceptual gaps. Two, the list
should contain an inherent mechanism to ensure the
principles are synthesized in a balanced and rational
manner. Those two imperatives guided the author’s thesis
formulation.
One could also counterargue that the concept of
flexibility is sufficiently grounded within the existing nine
principles (listed in Appendix I), particularly within the
principle of maneuver, and needs no further elaboration.
Such embedding, however, not only fails to give flexibility
its full regard, but it can represent a subtle, cultural
suppression of the idea. While the American warrior
generally understands the need for flexibility (and its close
cousin, adaptability), the degree to which the concept is
appreciated, or measures up, relative to the existing
principles represents an intellectual “gap” or “blind spot” in
the author’s view. Adopting flexibility as a principle of war
is the right solution—not only because it closes this gap, but
because, within the current context, it is a fundamental
principle. 4
One point needs emphasizing. This monograph does not
challenge the nine existing American principles of war in
any appreciable way; nor does it indorse them (compelling
arguments may exist for change 5). Rather, it concludes this:
within the current framework created by the nine adopted
p r i n c i p l e s o f w a r, one of the most fundamental
principles—flexibility—is missing from that structure.6

If that structure were to change, the concept of flexibility
must still be preserved. In the author’s view, a failure by the
U.S. military community to codify flexibility as a principle of
war is not just significant, it may become profound as
military operations enter the highly uncertain and complex
environment of the 21st century and the Information Age.
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To make this case, principles of war are reviewed from
both historical and contemporary perspectives. Notably, the
concept of flexibility is not a complete stranger as a
warfighting tenet or principle. Then, U.S. military basic
doctrine is briefly examined with a focus on the recent
renaissance of Joint capstone and keystone doctrine. Using
a conceptual model, the author describes how this
overarching doctrine lays the foundation for inculcating the
principles in the U.S. military. This becomes the intellectual
framework for the monograph’s thesis. Then, the English
definitions of the word “flexibility” are reviewed,
establishing the basis for its common understanding. This is
followed by the author’s proposed doctrinal definition of
flexibility as a principle of war. This definition is then used
throughout the rest of the monograph, in which flexibility as
a warfighting principle is developed and justified. By the
end, it should become apparent the American principles—
and the prospects for future military success—can be
fundamentally improved by embracing flexibility as a
principle of war. First, however, it is helpful to briefly
review the bases for the American adopted principles.
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
AND THEIR DOCTRINAL INFLUENCE
A symbiotic relationship exists between principles of
war and basic doctrine. This section addresses that
relationship by first examining the historical evolution of
the American principles and contemporary views about
them. It then considers the recent emergence of basic U.S.
Joint doctrine and presents a model illustrating the
influence of the principles, via both Joint and Service
doctrine, on U.S. military culture.
Evolution of the American-Adopted Principles.
The first step is to understand the historical basis for the
principles of war, reflecting Americans’ “instinctive search
for valid rules or guides.” 7 This historical review is followed
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by a discussion of several of the contemporary studies of the
principles found in the literature.
Lieutenant Colonel John Alger performed a valuable
service when he published the definitive work, The Quest for
Victory: The History of the Principles of War , in 1982. In this
book he chronicles the centuries of development leading to
today’s nine American adopted principles, as well as those of
other major countries. 8 Russell W. Glenn, formerly a U.S.
Army officer and now a senior defense and political analyst
with RAND Corporation, augments Alger’s work as well as
captures much of the subsequent Western contemporary
thought in his comprehensive Spring 1998 Parameters
article addressing the principles of war. 9
Both treatises reveal the distilled insights of the most
influential military thinkers through the ages, among them
Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Niccolai Machiavelli, Antoine-Henri
Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, J. F. C.
Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, Bernard Brodie, and others.
Implicit in these works is the clear realization that there has
never been, nor likely ever will be, one universally accepted
description or set of fundamental truths, principles, laws,
maxims, theories, arguments, axioms, rules, or judgments
about how to consistently secure victory in conflict. 10 Not
surprisingly, even agreement on what defines the concept of
a “principle” eludes consensus. 11
Even so, and as Alger notes below, in the 20th century,
prescriptions for principles of war began to coalesce around
the practice of developing comprehensive lists of singleword or short-phrase aphorisms:
The term “principles of war” did not always connote the idea of a
list of rules intended to facilitate the conduct of war. In fact, two
distinct definitions of the term have been widely used. First, the
principles of war represented a commonly accepted philosophy
concerning the myriad activities that collectively compose the
conduct of war. In the present century, however, the idea that
the principles of war are an enumerated list of considerations,
few in number, capable of being simply expressed and essential
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to the successful conduct of war, has become increasingly
accepted.12

This latter practice is primarily a Western one, with
Britain and the United States most fervently employing it.
In 1921, the U.S. Army formally codified for the first time
such a list of nine somewhat prescriptive “principles of war”
in War Department Training Regulation 10-5. 13 This
mirrored the J. F. C. Fuller-inspired British thinking of the
time, including his interpretation of the writings of Jomini
and Clausewitz among others, reflecting a strong
Napoleonic era influence and tactical focus on the battle. 14
The American list experienced much debate and several
perturbations (including disappearing for two extended
periods) before the U.S. Army settled, in 1949, on the
version in use today. 15 Debate notwithstanding, Table 1
shows the relatively minor differences between the Army’s
1921 version and the current list. This list has also been
adopted by the other U.S. military Services and by the Joint
community (discussed later).

1921 Principles

Current Principles

Objective

Objective

Offensive

Offensive

Mass

Mass

Economy of Force

Economy of Force

Movement

Maneuver

Surprise

Surprise

Security

Security

Simplicity

Simplicity

Cooperation

Unity of Command

Table 1. Comparison of 1921 and Current Principles
16
of War.
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Table 2, taken primarily from the 1997 issue of Armed
Forces Staff College (AFSC) Publication 1, compares the
recent-day principles of several countries (including the
former Soviet Union). While useful, the listing of words in
the last three columns should be taken only as an American
interpretation of the warfighting principles embraced by
those countries not a cataloguing of formally adopted terms.
This point is made to highlight the very American (and
British) tendency in the 20th century to distill principles of
war into short phrases and words. This monograph does not
judge the validity of that practice; rather, it simply
acknowledges that this 78-year, fully institutionalized
practice exists and will likely continue for the foreseeable
future. That is key to this monograph, for it is the continued
existence of a highly visible and relied upon list of principles
that demands it be well conceived and carefully designed.
Before discussing that further, it is helpful to consider other
recent literary works addressing the American principles of
war.
United
States

Great Britain
Australia

Former Soviet
Union “Principles of
Military Art”

People’s
Republic of
China

France

Objective

Selection &
maintenance
of aim

Offensive

Offensive Action

Mass

Concentration
of Force

Massing & Correlation Concentration
of Forces
of Effort

Economy
of Force

Economy
of Effort

Economy, Sufficiency
of Force

Maneuver

Flexibility

Initiative,
Mobility & Tempo

Initiative &
Flexibility

Unity
of Command

Cooperation

Interworking &
Coordination

Coordination

Security

Security

Surprise

Surprise

Selection &
Maintenance
of Aim
Offensive Action
Concentration
of Force

Security
Surprise

Surprise

Surprise

Simultaneous Attack
on All Levels,
Preservation of
Combat Effectiveness

Liberty of
Action

Morale, Mobility,
Political Mobilization,
Freedom of Action

Simplicity
17

Sustainability,
Maintenance
of Morale

Table 2. Principles of War.
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Contemporary Views.
Any person or organization braving to pronounce in the
military literature a set of “principles of war” could be
certain the list would be quickly (if not ruthlessly)
challenged. The U.S.-adopted principles are probably the
best example of that, being variously dissected, discussed,
supported, ridiculed, questioned, and, in general, critically
examined for nearly 80 years. That is healthy. As General
Frederick J. Kroesen wrote,
there is something satisfying about a set of postulates that can
be discussed, argued about, and referred to by the members of
our profession who take seriously the intellectual challenge of
war and combat operations.19

Given their susceptibility to “intellectual attack,” the
fact that the American-adopted principles have survived for
nearly 80 years with only minor changes is actually quite
remarkable. 20 However, as the world moves into a new
millennium, into the second decade following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and into what many believe is a true
revolution in military affairs (RMA), new arguments are
surfacing to modify—if not completely overhaul—the
American principles of war. Below are three of the more
recent treatises making such recommendations. All three
look at the issue from different perspectives. 21 They are
summarized here to give the reader a fuller perspective of
current dialogue regarding the American principles of war.
In 1995, five members of the U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published a monograph of
the American principles of war focused on the strategic (vice
operational or tactical) level of war 22 and their applicability
in the 21st century. 23 The authors offer a set of strategic
principles, within the framework of the existing nine
principles, that could help guide military strategists in the
more “intellectual” (read, “strategic”) aspects of
warfighting. 24 The SSI team did not directly challenge the
nine traditional American principles. 25 However, when
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considering the “strategic” realm of warfighting—upon
which, they assert, the traditional principles were not
founded—they recommend modifying the terms associated
with six of the nine principles. 26 Table 3 summarizes the
terminology changes. 27
Russell Glenn’s 1998 Parameters article had a different
focus, addressing the intellectual conundrum of having to
deal with two sets of adopted principles—principles of war,
and now, principles of military operations other than war
(MOOTW)28 (See Table 4). This second list was born from
the realization that a growing segment of military
operations simply doesn’t meet the traditional definition of
“war.” Hence, the principles of war were not entirely
applicable. Glenn suggests the U.S. Army has an
opportunity to synthesize the two lists into one before
releasing its next version of FM 100-5, Operations.29 His
article raises many of the long-standing issues regarding
the purpose, utility and application of doctrinal principles of
war. Some, like below, are even recommending “wiping the
slate clean.”
Traditional
Principles

“Strategic”
Principles

Objective

Objective

Offensive

Initiative

Unity of Command

Unity of Effort

Mass

Focus

Economy of Force

Economy of Effort

Maneuver

Orchestration

Simplicity

Clarity

Surprise

Surprise

Security

Security

Table 3. SSI’s “Strategic” Principles of War Versus
the Traditional Principles.
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Objective
Perseverance
Legitimacy
Restraint
Unity of Effort
Security
Table 4. Principles of Operations Other Than War.
In late 1998, Robert R. Leonhard, an active duty U.S.
Army lieutenant colonel, released a provocative, yet
insightful book titled The Principles of War for the
Information Age.30In his book, Leonhard rejects the entire
set of principles of war based on what he considers both their
obsolescence and intellectual bankruptcy in dealing with
conflict. 31 Leonhard does not reject the notion of identifying
and espousing principles of war. He asserts, though, that a
“principle” must not be treated as an “aphorism” (which he
defined as “a truth of some sort” 32) or a prescription; but
rather, as a basis for dialogue and argument. 33He proposes
three, immutable “laws of war” underpinning his seven
“principles of information age warfare.” These are
summarized in Table 5. Though his proposed principles may
at first appear to carry a format roughly similar to the
traditional nine, that is where any similarity abruptly ends.
Unlike the first two works presented, Leonard’s calls for a
radical shift in how the military uses and thinks about
principles of war, and his ideas deserve careful
consideration. In essence, the 78-year-old American
framework would need to be fundamentally altered. This
author has concluded such a change is not appropriate and
presents counterarguments in Appendix II. These
arguments need not, however, detract from Leonhard’s
valuable contribution to the field.
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LAWS OF WAR
The Law of Humanity
The Law of Economy
The Law of Duality

PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION AGE WARFARE
Principle of Knowledge and Ignorance
(Independent Principle)
Two Principles of
“Aggression”:

Two Principles of
“Interaction”:

Two Principles of
“Control”:

Dislocation and
Confrontation

Opportunity and
Reaction

Option Acceleration
and Objective

Distribution and
Concentration

Activity and Security

Command and
Anarchy

Table 5. Leonhard’s Laws of War and Principles of
34
Information Age Warfare.
All three works above—SSI’s, Glenn’s, and Leonhard’s—
carry relevance for this monograph in different ways and
are variously addressed within this monograph. First,
however, it is helpful to consider the modern role of U.S.
military doctrine.
THE PRINCIPLES’ INFLUENCE THROUGH BASIC
DOCTRINE
The right vehicle for championing the principles of war is
basic doctrine. 35 That idea is succinctly stated in U.S. Army
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: “Doctrine is the engine that
drives change . . . That is so because doctrine embodies our
ideas, and ideas drive change.” 36 This section examines that
key relationship by first reviewing the recent “renaissance”
in U.S. Joint doctrine, particularly in the development of
overarching capstone and keystone doctrinal documents.
Then, the author presents a simple conceptual model
depicting how doctrinal warfighting principles are instilled
in the organizational culture, and how this ultimately
affects warfighting ability.
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The “Renaissance” in U.S. Military Basic Doctrine.
Of the many changes brought about by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986, doctrinal policy
changes are now emerging as some of the most significant
and far-reaching. Title 10, United States Code, was changed
to specifically charge the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) with the responsibility for “developing doctrine
for the joint employment of the Armed Forces.” 37 No single
individual or organization had previously been responsible
for developing or promulgating Joint doctrine. 38 The 1986
GNA effectively established a clear doctrinal hierarchy
shattering the operational preeminence of the separate
Service doctrines over what little Joint doctrine previously
existed.39 However, this has not, conversely, caused any
“marginalization” of the Service doctrines. They remain,
necessarily, robust.
Most importantly, the GNA has proved the catalyst for a
very significant and positive across-the-board refocusing on
all military doctrine. On the Joint side, the tangible result
has been a virtual explosion of doctrinal publications. 40 This
rapid growth has not been without problems, 41 but the
process is maturing, and the Joint doctrine framework is
proving viable. 42 On the Service side, doctrinal authors now
strive to ensure operational congruence with Joint
publications. References to the Joint doctrine system and
implicit submission to the Joint doctrine hierarchy are
clearly evident.43
This has created a heretofore-not-seen “doctrinal
synergy” which is only recently becoming fully appreciated.
Though it has proved a difficult, iterative process, it appears
the Joint community and the Services, under the guiding
influence of the Chairman and the dual-hatted
Joint/Service Chiefs, have struck a delicate but effective
balance between Joint doctrine “preeminence” and Service
doctrine “freedom of expression.” 44 The resulting robust
library of U.S. military Service and Joint doctrine
represents the doctrinal “renaissance” referred to. This
11

translates into increased legitimacy of U.S. military
doctrine in general.
A Conceptual Model.
What that all means, in the simplest of terms, is this:
people are paying more attention to doctrine, and doctrine,
in turn, is having an even stronger influence on individuals
and organizations. The following passage by Major General
David Sawyer, at the time the Director, J-7, Joint Staff,
captures nicely this process of organizational influence by
way of doctrine:
The purpose of developing and disseminating authoritative
doctrine under a well-regulated system is not to issue rigid
fighting instructions but rather to share knowledge among
warfighters. This knowledge then is internalized for use in
decisionmaking regardless of the uniqueness of the situation,
rank of the individuals involved, or level of the decision.
Moreover, this shared body of knowledge enables those who
must implement decisions to use their understanding of the
general principles on which they are based to achieve specific
goals.45 (emphasis added)

This concept of pervasive influence can be most widely
applied to overarching Joint “capstone” and “keystone”
doctrinal documents and the Services’ “basic” doctrinal
documents. 46 These are the same documents traditionally
used to codify the American principles of war, and this is
done without exception in the above Joint, Army, Air Force,
and Navy doctrine documents. Most notably, the American
principles are prominently discussed in Chapter III of Joint
Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the
United States,47 as well as in Chapter II of Joint Publication
3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations , with expanded
definitions in a dedicated appendix. 48 Here, Joint
Publication 3-0 unabashedly states the principles of war
“are the enduring bedrock of U.S. military doctrine.” 49
Similar statements are made in the Service basic
doctrines. 50 That message regarding the importance of the
principles, as well as the nine principles themselves,
12

pervade the U.S. military culture. From initial officer
training, through all levels of professional military
education, operational training, policy making,
requirements, and resourcing decisions, Joint and Service
planning, and ultimately operational execution, the
principles influence activities in some way.
The model in Figure 1 graphically portrays these many
direct and indirect influences, with basic doctrine
representing both the catalyst and the continuity of
thought. As a measure of the comprehensiveness of that
influence, the model shows how all six of the traditional U.S.
Army Doctrine, Training, Leader Development,
Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTLOMS)
domains are touched in the process. 51 Not only are training
and leader development heavily influenced, but
organizational decisions, materiel procurement and soldier
(i.e., personnel) support are at least indirect beneficiaries.
Lastly, as can also be seen, the process is one of continuous
reinforcement.
Hence, the principles of war are becoming more deeply
ingrained in U.S. military culture—and in the mind of the
American warfighter—as basic doctrine grows in relevance.
Conversely, instituting any change in these fundamental,
cultural beliefs about warfighting must start with basic
doctrine. As will be shown, one such change is in order.

13

Figure 1. The Cascading Influence of Basic
Doctrine on Leader Development and
Organizational Culture.
14

FLEXIBILITY—THE MISSING PRINCIPLE
Nothing is changeless.59
— Mao Tse-tung

Appropriately, Mao was writing about the need to keep
doctrine relevant for the times. Actually, for this
monograph’s purposes, his statement carries an even more
transcendent message. The genuine conviction that
“nothing is changeless” is the essence of flexibility. As
suggested previously, institutionalizing that belief in the
American military culture begins with changing basic
doctrine. 53 This section expands on that imperative by
considering definitions of both the word and the doctrinal
principle of flexibility, and then by justifying flexibility’s
value as a principle of war in both conceptual and tangible
ways.
Given the assumption that common or societal
perceptions of a word’s meaning cannot be controlled, it is
important to understand and appreciate flexibility’s
common definitions. These definitions are reviewed below,
followed by the author’s proposed doctrinal definition of the
principle of flexibility.
Common Definitions of “Flexibility.”
The common definitions of “flexibility,” including the
word’s synonyms, represent the center point from which
individual interpretations of its meaning begin to diverge.
Surveying the field of popular dictionaries yielded three
consistent definitions for the word “flexible” (all the
dictionaries define “flexibility” [the adverb] as “the quality
or state of being flexible,” or something to that effect). A
representative set of these three definitions of “flexible” (the
adjective), in the order listed, is: “1. Capable of being bent or
flexed; pliable. 2. Susceptible to influence or persuasion;
tractable. 3. Responsive to change; adaptable: a flexible
schedule.”54 Popular synonyms for “flexible” (in alphabetical
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order) are: adaptable, agile, ductile, elastic, extendable,
limber, malleable, resilient, plastic, pliable/pliant, springy,
and supple. 55 The aggregate of these definitions and
common synonyms captures the idea, or concept, of
flexibility that has to be accepted when considering how the
public at large identifies with the word. Similarly, one
cannot stray far from this idea or concept in formulating a
description of flexibility as a principle of war.
Proposed Doctrinal Definition.
Below is the author’s proposed doctrinal definition of
flexibility as a principle of war. It makes primary use of the
third and first common definitions above (in that order), but
it does not completely avoid the second, for a certain
“susceptibility” to influence is deemed a positive attribute,
suggestive of a healthy open-mindedness. 56 The doctrinal
definition also incorporates several of flexibility’s more
common synonyms. The bullet format of the below
definition parallels those definitions found in Joint
Publication 3-0 (which all begin with, “The purpose of”). The
term “military operations” (versus “war” or “conflict” or
other term) was specifically chosen to permit wide
application as a principle of war, or of operations other than
war, or simply, as a principle of operations.57
Flexibility
• #1 (Short Definition): The purpose of flexibility is to be
responsive to change and adaptable to the volatility,
pressures and complexities of military operations, while
constantly focusing on the objective.
•#2 (Expanded, Supporting Definition): Flexibility is
both a state of mind and a characteristic of effective
military units. It is an antidote to surprise, uncertainty
and chance. Flexibility represents the fundamental
ability to avoid dogmatic rigidity and to “bend” as each
situation demands—to be receptive, responsive, and
adaptive—and like a flexible, resilient rod, to neither
16

break nor lose orientation. Flexible units and leaders
adapt to changing conditions in opportunistic and
innovative ways, yet never lose focus on the commander’s
intent. Flexible leaders encourage critical, creative
thinking, ensuring all realistic alternatives and possible
outcomes are considered throughout mission planning
and execution. Flexibility—the antithesis of rigidity—is
the crucial ability to synthesize all of the principles, and
to prioritize their application in each unique situation to
ensure success.
It is important to immediately appreciate two technical
points about this doctrinal definition. First, the principle of
flexibility is congruent with the structure of the existing list;
i.e., it represents a condition, activity, behavior, or effect
(primarily the first three) deemed essential to success in
war. Second, the concept is similar to the other principles in
that it is applicable (maybe more so than any of the other
nine) across a very broad horizontal and vertical spectrum
of activity. Armed with this definition, it is now instructive
to consider the full power of the concept of flexibility as a
principle of war.
FILLING THE CONCEPTUAL “GAP”
How forcible are right words!58
— The Holy Bible: Job

As discussed earlier, the “right” word or idea, effectively
promulgated, will positively influence people and
organizations. This section focuses on the warfighting
power derived from the word, and from the idea of,
flexibility. Following that, the author postulates on the
subtle yet specious reasoning that has likely prevented
flexibility’s adoption as a principle of war.
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Flexibility’s Inherent Conceptual Strengths.
The above doctrinal definition not only reveals
flexibility’s enormous strength as a warfighting principle
across the wide range of military operations, but also how it
acts as an enabling mechanism to synthesize the other
principles. It underpins them, while paying due homage to
the preeminent principle of objective. 59 This represents the
unique, “dual-hatted” nature of flexibility as both a
principle and as a harmonizing force for the others. This is
depicted in Figure 2. Note how the central focus is on the
principle of objective, while flexibility synthesizes the
application of all the principles.
If one were forced to distill all principles of war into one
thought, or one idea, the most basic would have to be the
notion of “winning,” or “victory,” or “success,” or “achieving

Figure 2. Flexibility’s “Dual-Hatted” Role as a Principle
of War and as a Synthesizer of the Other Principles.
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the aim” or “achieving the objective.” However, if one were
permitted to combine that with just one additional idea,
few if any carry the universal utility and transcendent
power of the concept of flexibility. 60 Consider the
followingdescriptions of the essential thinking of two of
history’s master strategists:
Sun Tzu believed that the only constant in war is constant
change and to illustrate this he used several figures of speech,
among which is “of the five elements, none is always
predominant.” . . . Sun Tzu sees the business of a general to
consist, in part, of . . . manipulating [changes] to his
advantage. . . [His] theory of adaptability to existing situations
is an important aspect of his thought. Just as water adapts
itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war one must be
flexible; he must often adapt his tactics to the enemy situation
. . . [revealing] another aspect of the intellectual pliancy which
distinguishes the expert in war.61 (emphasis added)
[Clausewitz asserted one of the permanent characteristics of
war] was the free play of human intelligence, will and
emotions. These were the forces that dominated the chaos of
warfare . . . [He] exposed the inadequacy of prescriptive
systems when faced with the infinite resources of the mind and
spirit . . . The realm of genius . . . rises above all the rules . . .
Theory and its resultant doctrines are thus subordinate to the
great creative talent, and to the universals of reason and
feeling that it expresses.62

While each was somewhat different in focus, both Sun
Tzu and Clausewitz were distilling warfighting down to an
essentially intellectual pursuit of the object within the
unavoidable environments of chance, change, chaos, and
friction. In essence, what both theorists are strongly
suggesting is the fundamental need for a disposition of
flexibility.
Further, the need for flexibility is equally strong at all
levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic—
although it can manifest itself in different ways at the
different levels. The SSI monograph (discussed earlier)—a
noteworthy attempt to capture “higher level” warfighting
19

principles while preserving the traditional nine-principle
framework of the last 78 years—reveals the inherent
difficulty of making one set of terms apply to all the
essentials and levels of warfighting. However, the authors
would doubtless have found no reason to modify the term or
the concept of flexibility in describing this tenth strategic
principle of war. On the tactical and operational levels the
same holds true. The infantry scout platoon, unexpectedly
hit with nerve agent, suffering heavy casualties and cut off
from its command structure; the air expeditionary force
commander, still deploying enroute to the forward base and
forced to generate initial strike sorties 24 hours ahead of the
planned H-hour due to enemy advances; the joint force
commander whose entire primary and secondary
operational C 3 links are electronically sabotaged during
combat strike operations; or the theater commander in chief
(CINC) ordered to prosecute a high-risk, short-notice
amphibious noncombatant evacuation operation—all of
these units and leaders will better cope with those
situations through flexible planning, or if planning fails,
through flexible adaptation. Flexibility conditions the mind
to accept the tactical, operational, and strategic truth that
no plan survives first contact. It helps create a certain
“tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.” Clearly,
flexibility carries broad applicability across the wide range
of military activities.
Moreover, when taking the view that preparations for
war are an essential aspect of war fighting, the benefits of
adopting flexibility as a principle become greatly magnified.
While flexibility’s strengths are most easily conceptualized
in the “post-contact” phase of conflict, i.e., as a response,
flexible planning can be the vital force that shapes the
outcome. A flexible planning disposition is one that is not
necessarily satisfied with the first answer nor the popular
one. It represents a critical search for blind spots and
overlooked branches and sequels within the time available
to plan. Flexible leaders carry a healthy respect for chance,
uncertainty, and friction, creating an environment that
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rewards—not stifles—creative and innovative thinking
during planning. Finally, flexible warfighters couple that
skill with a decisive sense of purpose and timing, always
knowing when to “move out.”
Preparations for war, however, comprise much more
than the tactical and operational planning described above,
and flexibility plays a key role here, too. The Figure 1 model
depicts how a doctrinal appreciation for flexibility touches
all DTLOMS domains, influencing everyday thought and
behavior. This heightened cultural appreciation for
flexibility creates a circular pattern of reinforcement,
whereby adaptiveness, creativity and innovation would be
institutionalized in every facet of the organization. This in
turn creates economies that free up resources. In the end,
preparations for war and war waging ability are enhanced.
Flexibility also intuitively applies to any military
operation, whether or not strictly defined as “war.” Russell
Glenn’s recent monograph (discussed earlier) highlights the
military’s growing roles in non-warlike missions and the
challenge of capturing “principles of non-war” in doctrine.
The current six “Principles of Military Operations Other
Than War” found in Joint Publications 3-0 and 3-07 (and in
some Service documents) capture the MOOTW principles in
a fashion similar to the nine war principles. Much like the
nine principles, a conceptual gap exists, and it is this same
synthesizing force—flexibility—which is missing. There
can be no more compelling need for flexibility than, say, in
the environment of a large peacekeeping operation. Unclear
or evolving objectives and difficult interagency coordination, complex regional socio-cultural and nationalistic
sources of hostile intent, numerous international military
forces represented under different commanders, and loosely
controlled private and nongovernmental organizations all
pursuing various agendas and under various sets of rules,
are the norm. In this environment, flexibility is not only an
“antidote to surprise, uncertainty, and chance,” but it
encourages a mindset that helps overcome frustration.
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Flexibility should clearly be a fundamental principle of
military operations other than war.
Equally important, flexibility is tacit recognition that
doctrine—including the principles of war themselves—must
never become dogma. Flexibility underscores the notion
that every principle need not apply with equal utility in
every situation (some even suggest, for example, that “the
[current nine] principles of war themselves in some ways
contradict each other” 64). The idea that all principles are not
equally and completely useful in all cases may offend purist
who believes in their inviolate sanctity. However, the
essence of flexibility is to not take so lofty (or dogmatic) a
view. The forms that conflict can take—and hence the
solutions—can be infinite. This represents the crucial
synthesizing function of the concept and principle of
flexibility
Interestingly, and in this same vein, many works in the
literature addressing the principles of war can be thought of
as pleas for flexible application of the principles themselves!
It is as though an unwritten rule exists (discussed more in
the next section) suggesting that flexibility is not to be listed
as a principle. 6 5 This, in turn, drives voluminous
discussions on the need to flexibly apply the principles.
Consider the following passage from Robert Leonhard’s
work:
. . . we usually find that most writing on principles of warfare
recognizes the need for flexible application. The requirement for
flexibility derives from two factors. First, . . . every military
situation is different. Therefore, the theory and practice of arms
must adapt to each unique situation. But the other factor
requiring flexible application is that the principles of war
themselves in some ways contradict each other . . . thus
requiring great flexibility of thought and application.66

This is a recurring theme in the literature. General Donn
A. Starry, following his tour as U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine (TRADOC) Commander, authored a much-cited
article on the principles of war. Like Leonhard, he makes
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the argument for flexibility, yet more subtly, without ever
using the word. Consider his statement below (certain
terms are italicized by this author for emphasis):
The military professional derives from this analysis [of
warfare] the fundamental principles—their combinations and
applications—which have produced success on the battlefields
of history. The principles of war thus derived are, therefore, a
part of the art rather than the science of war. They are neither
immutable nor causal, nor do they provide precise
mathematical formula for success in battle. Their value lies in
their utility as a frame of reference for analysis of strategic and
tactical issues.67

Author Paul Katz made the same point in a rudimentary
but clear fashion when he wrote, “It seems the principles of
war are incomplete and that some of the principles are true
only in particular situations.” 68 Very true, yet what
principle within the current list conveys those important
points? His statement makes for a good point of departure.
As will be discussed below, it is time to resolve both of the
dilemmas he describes.
Unlocking the Concept—Overcoming Intellectual
Obstacles.
As seen, strong intuitive arguments support flexibility
as a principle of war. That, of course, begs the question: why
isn’t flexibility an adopted principle? Why does it seem to be
suppressed? There appear several reasons for this, yet none
of them, after close analysis, justify flexibility’s exclusion as
a principle of war. The author must emphasize the following
are purely intuitive arguments—little, if any, qualitative
support exists; therefore, the author tried not to stray too far
from clear, supportable logic. On the other hand, to the
extent this section simply attempts to explain why
flexibility is absent, the author takes some license. Let us
explore each argument.
First, one could reason that flexibility is adequately
represented within the principle of maneuver. The opening
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line in Joint Publication 3-0 defining maneuver would tend
to support that. It states, “The purpose of maneuver is to
place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the
flexible application of combat power.” 69 Typical discussions
of the concept of maneuver invariably highlight flexibility in
one way or another. In fact, effective maneuver demands
high degrees of flexibility—both mental and physical. This
is not contestable. But the key question becomes, are the two
concepts sufficiently similar to warrant exclusion of one over
the other as a principle of war ? The answer is no. Flexibility
brings too much to the table that maneuver cannot; so much
so, that some militaries have adopted flexibility as a
principle at the expense of listing maneuver .70 Incorporating
flexibility would actually release some of the current
“semantic burdens” on the principle of maneuver, allowing a
better focus on its more traditional, physical definition, with
“borrowing as needed” from the companion principle of
flexibility. While the word “flexibility” isn’t found within the
Joint Publication 3-0 definitions of the other principles, the
concept is nearly as prevalent as it is in maneuver, again
reflecting flexibility’s unique yet crucial synthesizing
value.71 Hence, the maneuver argument is weak at best.
Second, the above logic might dangerously lead to an
almost opposite and equally incorrect conclusion; i.e., that
flexibility is so pervasive and fundamental, that “it goes
without saying.” What “principle,” however, could be so
“fundamental” that it “goes without saying?” The Services,
in what sometimes seems an attempt to compensate for
flexibility’s absence as a principle of war, have manifested
the term in other ways. The U.S. Air Force has codified
“flexibility and versatility” as “tenets of aerospace power” in
AFDD-1. 72 The U.S. Army lists flexibility as a “characteristic” of the defense and lists the sister concepts of
versatility and agility as “tenets” of Army Operations. 73 The
U.S. Navy, in Chapter One of NDP-1, contains the following
statement in the section titled, “The Character of Naval
Forces:”
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The qualities that characterize most modern naval forces as
political instruments in support of national policies are the
same as those that define the essence of our naval Services
today. These qualities are readiness, flexibility,
self-sustainability, and mobility.74

Some Joint doctrine documents reflect similar efforts.
For example, Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics
Support of Joint Operations , lists flexibility as one the seven
Principles of Logistics. 75 Some of this can be attributed to
valid uses of the term “flexibility” to describe specific
capabilities or requirements within an activity or medium;
i.e., not as a principle of war. However, as shown, the
concept of flexibility carries much broader application—it is
an essential, immutable requirement for success, supported
by the teachings of history’s great strategists. Can anything
demonstrated so fundamentally important in war be
excluded as a principle of war? Clearly, the answer is no.
Third, could it be—and the author’s evidence here is
anecdotal at best—that the notion of flexibility connotes
something distasteful to the psyche of the American
military officer? This is admittedly a weaker argument, but
it may contribute in some way to a cultural suppression of
the word. Recall that the second of three traditional
definitions of flexibility address a “susceptibility” to
influence or persuasion. While this is the least applicable of
the three definitions as a principle of war, 76 the concept
certainly doesn’t play well intuitively against the more
prevalent Napoleonic and Jominian era notions of
annihilation, total war, if not the sometimes blind
glorification of the offensive. Sun Tzu’s indirect approach,
which the U.S. military never fully appreciated during the
Vietnam conflict (to its demise), seems to play more to the
intuitive notion of flexibility. One could ask whether
Pickett’s Charge, or Verdun, or other large-scale,
force-on-force human disasters might have happened had
the leaders of the day had a more ingrained appreciation for
the notion of flexibility. Though these rhetorical if overly
simplified questions have no easy answers, the author is
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attempting to describe a cultural force that may in some
way be contributing to flexibility’s suppression today.
Similarly, flexibility can be thought of as acting at
cross-purposes with doctrine itself. Doctrine is loosely
defined as “the way things ought to be done.” Flexibility can
represent just the opposite! If taking this to the more
extreme notion of nonconformity, flexibility can be
perceived as heresy in a rigid, dogmatic environment. While
this author is in no way encouraging a disregard for
established rules and norms, leaders must conversely
appreciate the dangers of “blind” adherence—as well as
leadership styles that demand it. There is plenty of
anecdotal evidence to suggest stifling, nonflexible
dispositions exist in the military. Some believe this is the
pervasive norm. Respected military academician and
sociologist Gregory Foster, in a classic think piece on the
state of today’s officer corps, recently wrote the following:
As an institution, the military largely discourages independent
thought and critical inquiry. This is an unfortunate,
self-defeating contradiction for a profession whose raison d’être
is closely tied to outwitting adversaries and grappling with
uncertainty. Undue emphasis on obedience and loyalty to the
chain of command stifles dissent and erodes the spirit of inquiry
so critical to institutional vitality. Pervasive doctrine,
regulations, and operating procedures breed an orthodoxy that
drives out any felt need for originality . . . Moreover, there are
few rewards for . . . “unproductive” intellectual pursuits. By the
time officers reach senior rank, they have been thoroughly
schooled in what to think, yet poorly prepared in how to think.77

If one accepts Foster’s portrait—even if only partially—
it is hard to deny the existence of some level of built-in
cultural aversion to both the notion of flexibility as well as
any suggestion to change basic doctrine to better
accommodate it.
There seems, in fact, an almost inescapable “gravity”
associated with challenging the integrity of a list of
warfighting principles described in Joint keystone doctrine
as “enduring bedrock.”78 Such a phrase is a protective
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measure to lift up and fence those fundamental warfighting
ideas truly prized by the institution. There is much value in
that. But that also carries a certain danger which many
have recognized over the ages. Rigid adherence to
prescriptive warfighting “rules” is likely as responsible for
past military failures as any other general cause. Adopting
flexibility as a principle of war and reinforcing that concept
would introduce a moderating influence to counter that
danger. “Doctrinal flexibility” need not be an oxymoron.
Moreover, a doctrine that espouses flexibility as a
fundamental principle may help warfighters more
effectively glean “true” lessons from past operations and
avoid repeat mistakes. As historian Williamson Murray
writes:
Throughout history, military organizations . . . have tended to
extract from their experiences as well as the experiences of
others only what supported their preconceived notions
[emphasis added]. In fact, existing doctrine has in most cases
become a barrier to adaptation and improvement.
Unfortunately, military historians have largely ignored the
process in which doctrine and battlefield experiences interact
and the ways in which armies adapt or do not adapt to the
changing conditions.79

Could it be that our doctrine, in its present form, hinders
that effective adaptation? Has the concept of flexibility, as a
principle of war, simply been missing? One thing is certain:
the need to think and act in ways counter to dogmatic and
habitual forces will only grow as we move into the next
century.
THE GROWING IMPERATIVE
This monograph has thus far made the case for flexibility
as a missing principle of war. In the next millennium, the
need for flexibility in all military operations will simply
grow. Debate over the very nature of future warfare,
including the forms conflict will take, is proving a
consuming activity. Potentially tectonic shifts in the world’s
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global security environment will not only add impetus to
existing arguments for flexibility, but they will drive new
ones. To effectively grapple with these points, it is
important to first attempt a rational prediction of what the
future portends.
The Future Global Security Environment.
The future global security picture remains murky at
best. In its 1998 Strategic Assessment, the Institute for
National Strategic Studies loosely bounds its predictions
with optimistic and pessimistic scenarios:
In the best plausible case, an expanded core or commonwealth of
peaceful democracies could encompass most of the planet—with
U.S. partners shouldering an increased share of the burden of
defending common interests and norms. China would reform
and integrate into the core, rogue states and nonstates would be
defanged, state failures would be averted, and energy and
infrastructure would be secure. In the worst case, U.S. friends
could be free riders instead of responsible partners, China’s
reforms would founder, state failures would multiply, and
rogues armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
nonstate actors would threaten the energy supplies and
infrastructure of the core—leaving the [United States] superior
but beleaguered. Well-armed enemies would be tempted to
threaten the interests of the United States, using the fear of
high casualties and possible attacks on the state itself to
degrade America’s ability to project power and national will.80

Narrowing that call toward the pessimistic side (and by
no means alone in his view), foreign policy analyst David
Twining predicts traditional diplomacy and political
processes—and the current promise of multilateral
cooperation—will not be sufficient to deal with looming
global challenges due to the inability of traditional
institutions to adapt quickly enough. 81 Adding complexity
to that picture, Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters,
Department of the Army, suggests “historians may well dub
the decades surrounding the change from the second
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millennium to the third millennium as an age of multiple
and simultaneous revolutions.” 82 In sum, the common
predictive threads for the evolving global security
environment are: significant complexity, turbulent change,
wildly ranging scenarios of power centers and polarities,
multiple revolutions across several domains, and—most
importantly in this author’s opinion—profound
uncertainty. 83
From a warfighting perspective, the implications are
daunting. First, the spectrum of possible conflict will only
widen, and the military’s charge to “fight” and “win” will
take on an increasingly broader scope. This demands the
U.S. military continue its relevant industrial age practices
while also adapting to new and evolving types of future
conflict, including multiple forms of asymmetrical warfare.
Further, many believe we are undergoing a fundamental
revolution in military affairs (RMA), while others counter
we are simply seeing technological change on a grand scale.
Regardless, there is no denying the watershed change
around us. The U.S. military must shift its thinking to
encompass a larger spectrum of warfare to both reduce risk
and remain viable. Editors Barry R. Schneider and
Lawrence E. Grinter come to a similar conclusion in their
recent book, Battlefield of the Future; 21 st Century Warfare
Issues:
. . . the dangers of confronting an adversary with weapons of
mass destruction or the capacity for strategic information
warfare may prompt a very different thinking about the
traditional “principles of war.” Preparing for such an
eventuality will require some major changes in C3I (command,
control, communications, and intelligence), military doctrine,
operational strategy, acquisition, equipment, logistics,
coalition building, coalition warfare, and war termination.
Some changes may even be necessary in foreign policy
regarding the kinds of commitments that U.S. vulnerabilities,
capabilities, and interests will permit in a more proliferated
world or one where the enemy has utilized the technologies
and methods of information warfare.84
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This passage is typical of recent studies of future
warfare; namely, there is much hedging. That is to be
expected, given the ambiguities, complexities, and
uncertainties in the coming millennium. As will be
discussed, incorporating flexibility as a principle of war is
the appropriate and fundamental way to help deal with
these evolving challenges.
Flexibility’s Utility in the 21st Century.
In 1996, General John M. Shalikashvili, then Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), unveiled his “conceptual
template” to address joint warfighting in the evolving
post-Cold War environment. This template was titled Joint
Vision 2010 (JV 2010). 85 While JV 2010’s release has
sparked a vigorous debate over its relative merits, 86 it is
undeniably a unique and bold attempt to provide written,
visionary direction where none previously existed. The
Services are, for the most part, coalescing behind JV 2010
and adopting the conceptual framework formed by the four
“emerging operational concepts” of Dominant Maneuver,
Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and FullDimensional Protection, each enabled by Information
Superiority and Technological Innovation. 87
A salient point for this monograph is that JV 2010, and
its follow-on, supporting publication, Concept for Future
Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010 , 88
repeatedly and pervasively use the terms “flexibility” and
“adaptability.” This reflects the clear realization that
flexibility is crucial to successfully negotiating the future
global security environment. Flexibility as a doctrinal
warfighting principle would help foster open-minded, less
judgmental Service cultures, helping to further overcome
destructive Service parochialisms while protecting Service
identities. Jointness would be more clearly seen as the key
enabler for flexible warfighting, encouraging deeper trust
and understanding among all the Services.
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When considering flexibility’s proposed doctrinal
definition as a principle of war, one can see the concept has
broad utility at all three levels of conceivable future conflict
(as well as MOOTW operations). At the tactical,
operational, and even strategic levels, a prime example is
the requirement to flexibly task organize for any
conceivable contingency. U.S. Joint doctrine addressing the
formation of joint and combined contingency forces is now
hailed for its extreme flexibility and demonstrated
effectiveness. Recent emphasis on “adaptive joint force
packaging” is a good example of efforts in this decade to
recapture the art of flexibly tailoring forces for any given
contingency. 89 The Services are similarly following suit
within their roles as force providers. The U.S. Air Force’s
evolving and robust expeditionary aerospace force (EAF)
concept and the U.S. Army’s Force XXI emphasis on
“tailorability and modularity” reflect this emphasis on
flexible task organizing. 90 These efforts would be further
and directly reinforced by adopting flexibility as an
American principle of war.
Moreover, when considering preparations for war as
part of the larger context of warfighting, flexibility’s value
increases. Tactically and operationally, in battle and
campaign planning, a flexible disposition demands that all
reasonable courses of action, branches, and sequels be fully
explored and developed in the time available. Flexible
responses are often born of flexible planning. Further, in
tomorrow’s unfolding environment where asymmetric and
other nontraditional threats will become more prevalent,
open-minded, nonjudgmental and critical thinking
skills—at all ranks and levels of war—will become the tools
to eliminate dangerous blind spots and develop effective
solutions. That is flexibility.
Flexible preparations for war can also take on a broader,
more strategic shape in the form of force modernization and
experimentation efforts. The recent creation of joint
warfighting capability assessment (JWCA) teams as
“innovation engines” within the Joint Requirements
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Oversight Council (JROC) structure represents a flexible
approach to solving Service interoperability and
modernization challenges. 91 Similarly, the military’s
emerging emphasis on aggressive experimentation and
simulation directly supports the principle of flexibility.
Conversely, adopting flexibility as a principle of war would
send a powerful message and act as a unifying force for such
efforts. Focused, innovative problem-solving approaches
and creative experimentation would be routinely rewarded
at all levels, from the laboratory, to the Service and Joint
training/warfighting centers, to Service, Joint, and
congressional resource allocation activities, fostering even
greater releases of creative energies and yielding larger
rewards.
Finally, as discussed earlier, future forms of warfare can
take many paths, and much uncertainty lies ahead.
Strategists will continue to evaluate the principles of war in
this evolving security environment and judge their
relevance. To the degree new forms of warfare are additive
to existing forms, the principles will retain some level of
validity. To the degree new forms of warfare replace old
forms, the principles’ future validity must be re-tested.
Either way, one thing is certain: as we move into the 21st
century, the need for flexibility as an adopted principle of
war will only grow.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This monograph makes the case for flexibility as a
principle of war, but neither challenges nor specifically
indorses the other nine principles, which have existed,
unchanged, for nearly 50 years. That was not the focus of
this monograph. Nor does it challenge, in a more general
sense, the long-standing practice of codifying a list of
“pseudo-prescriptive” terms designed to capture our most
essential and enduring warfighting principles. Rather, this
author accepts that highly institutionalized framework
while arguing the concept of flexibility is largely missing
from it. Over the years, this omission has been ameliorated
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somewhat by the body of doctrine, writings, and teachings
which implicitly suggests a “disposition of flexibility.”
However, that suggestion or message to the warfighter is
inconsistent at best. Given the evolving, highly complex,
and uncertain future global security environment, such an
ambiguity could prove disastrous. There will simply be no
room for rigid, nonadaptive dispositions and behaviors. To
preclude any further ambiguity in the message, therefore,
the principle of flexibility must be more clearly and
forcefully espoused by senior U.S. military leadership.
The right end-state is formal codification of flexibility as
a principle of war in the appropriate U.S. Joint and Service
basic doctrinal documents. To best ensure this change
occurs in an orderly, hierarchical fashion, capstone
doctrinal document Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the
Armed Forces of the United States , and keystone doctrinal
document Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations, should be modified first. These are the two
overarching Joint warfighting doctrinal documents
addressing the principles of war. This change must be
accompanied by aggressive oversight and coordination by
the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, working with all other Joint
and Service doctrinal organizations, so that similar changes
in appropriate Joint and Service doctrine documents follow.
To arrive at this end-state, lively and broad debate must
first take place within the military community. This author
encourages such debate yet cautions that unlike the often
unconstrained American deliberative process, successful
warfighting strategies must sometimes be developed under
“tighter” schedules. Put simply, we need to get on with this
debate, because the time to fully embrace flexibility as a
principle of war is now. Responsibility for stimulating that
dialogue rests with senior military leaders and strategists,
with strong backing from the literary community.
Ultimately, through this process, the Director, J-7, Joint
Staff, would receive the necessary guidance from the
Chairman (hopefully with full consensus and support of the
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Joint/Service Chiefs) to initiate the formal codification
procedure previously described.
These recommendations no doubt carry heavy
administrative challenges, conjuring an image of
re-chiseling age-old stone tablets of immutable truth (or, in
military speak, “re-writing a lot of regs”). But the
administrative cost of change pales in comparison to the
long-term benefits. Doctrine must remain both nimble and
responsive to warfighting needs. One paradox in
implementing this change is that it will take an attitude of
flexibility to culturally adopt and instill one. Yet that is the
challenge of senior leadership—to know and appreciate
what is truly right for the organization, and then, with
vision and determination, be the catalyst for positive
change.
CONCLUSION
The difference between the almost-right word & the right word
is really a large matter—it is the difference between the
lightning bug and the lightning.92
— Mark Twain

This monograph has focused on one word. More
specifically, it has focused on the absence of the word—and
the warfighting principle of—flexibility. The purpose was to
underscore the seemingly subtle, yet significant and
positive influence this single word would have if codified as
a principle of war. Some would argue we live in a world of
sound bites and aphorisms, and the modern-day principles
of war are no more than a dangerous manifestation of that,
not warranting serious attention. Yet to ignore this 78-year,
institutionalized practice is to ignore the principles’ very
real influence on the fabrics of U.S. military Joint and
Service cultures. Senior leaders must understand and
appreciate that this simple list called the “principles of war”
carries transcendent powers to affect behavior and thought
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in manifold ways. Further, we must never take lightly a list
that speaks directly to this profession’s reason for being.
U.S. military doctrine recently received a much-needed
shot in the arm, sparked by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Act, resulting in a renewed emphasis on Joint and Service
doctrinal publications. As a result, warfighters are paying
more attention to doctrine. At the same time, titanic and
revolutionary changes in the global security environment
are creating uncertainties on a grand scale. “Conflict” will
take on new forms, yet traditional forms will remain.
Warfighting resources will remain at a premium, and
strategies to fight and win at all levels of conflict must
continue to evolve in highly adaptive, innovative, and
creative ways.
This all combines to underscore the imperative to adopt
flexibility as a principle of war in basic doctrine. Through
doctrine, a deepened cultural appreciation for flexibility
would be instilled, as would the capability of warfighting
units to effectively adapt and respond to the prevalent
change and uncertainty of the times. Ultimately, flexibility
becomes the synthesizing force to prioritize the application
of all of the principles of war to meet each unique challenge,
across the wide range of military operations.
As Mark Twain suggested, words do make a difference.
Pronouncing flexibility as an American principle of war in
Joint and Service doctrine would drive a subtle yet
profoundly important heading change as the U.S. military
confronts its growing responsibilities into the next
millennium.
ENDNOTES
1. From Fables, Book 1, Fable 22, 1668. See Jean de La Fontaine,
The Fables of La Fontaine, Marianne Moore, trans., New York: Viking
Press, 1954, p. 33.
2. Some doctrinal circles, particularly within the U.S. Army, have
considered adopting the term “principles of operations” as a way to more
fully capture the spectrum of military activities. This terminology

35

debate is not crucial to this monograph’s purposes, for it will be shown
the principle of flexibility would apply equally to the activities
represented by either term.
3. Bernard Brodie, for example, discusses Clausewitz’s “pronounced
disinclination to provide formulas or axioms as guides to actions.”
Brodie continues,
[Clausewitz] is often intent upon demonstrating the pitfalls of
such axioms . . . [and], on the contrary, invites his readers to
ruminate with him on the complex nature of war, where any
rule that admits of no exceptions is usually too obvious to be
worth much discourse.
See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,
eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 57. Russell F.
Weigley, in his famous treatise, The American Way of War, states,
The principles of war tended during the 1920s, and still do
today, to receive inordinate attention. Amid the harsh pressures
of war and combat it is surely helpful to have at hand such
straightforward guides to conduct, but the principles are so
straightforwardly simple and general that they can lead astray
almost as easily as they can assist.
See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 214. As will be discussed in this
monograph, culturally instilling the notion of flexibility within the
current framework would likely serve to obviate the very dangers
Brodie and Weigley, among others, are referring to.
4. This presumes the framework created by the American-adopted
“principles of war” is not fundamentally or radically altered in such a
manner that the term “flexibility” loses parallel structure. If that were to
happen, this author would assert the “essence” of flexibility must
remain an integral concept of that new structure or framework.
5. Several of these arguments will be reviewed. Regardless, as the
spectrum of conceivable forms of warfare expands, the adopted
principles of war must be tested for their universality. This monograph
is a product of that belief.
6. Though beyond the scope of this monograph, this author believes
there may exist a second, significant conceptual gap in the framework of
adopted American principles—namely, the concept, or principle, of
“sustainment” or “logistics” (similar to the principle of “sustainability”

36

recently adopted by the United Kingdom in place of the previous
principle of “administration”). This relates to the widely-held notion
that “resourcing” or sustaining the activities of war or conflict will
always prove an inherent challenge that must be effectively addressed.
The author has not thoroughly researched this subject nor conceptually
and rigorously tested “sustainment” against the understood
requirement that, to be a principle, it must be a broad, enduring “truth”
(or “basis for argument,” as will be discussed), applicable across the
range of military activities. It certainly warrants additional research.
For a discussion of sustainment as an adopted principle of war, see
British Ministry of Defence, British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare
Publication, (JWP) 0-01, London: Caldwell Prince, Ltd., 1997, p. A-7,
A-8. Also see Stephanie A. Rast, The Tenth Principle, Monograph
Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 1989,
wherein the author argues for the principle of sustainment. Finally, see
Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., Battlefield of the
Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University
Press, 1998, pp. 32-36, in which Dr. Schneider argues for the principle of
“logistics” (one of four proposed new principles of war, of which the other
three do not qualify in the author’s view). In any case, by first adopting
flexibility as a principle of war, the conditions are best set for a rigorous
and critical debate over sustainment, or any other concept considered a
potential “principle” of war.
7. Marshall L. Falwell, “The Principles of War and the Solution of
Military Problems,” Military Review, May 1955, p. 62.
8. Alger cites over 100 “principles” (that term is used loosely here)
that have been proposed or embraced by various strategists, militaries,
and nations. See John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the
Principles of War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.
9. Russell W. Glenn, “No More Principles of War?,” Parameters,
Spring 1998, pp. 48-66. Glenn’s title is misleading, because it is not the
focus of his article. His point, rather, is that (at the writing of the article)
the draft of the U.S. Army’s basic doctrine manual, U.S. Army Field
Manual (FM) 100-5, did not reflect any changes to the long-standing set
of American adopted principles nor attempt to synthesize it with the
recently developed list of “principles of military operations other than
war.” In other words, Glenn believes the Army may be missing an
opportunity to make appropriate, possibly substantive changes to the
adopted set of principles. He does not suggest, as his title implies, that
the principles of war be abolished in favor of no list.
10. The author uses the term “conflict” interchangeably with the
term “war.” This is a more traditional use of the word, versus its use by

37

some Services to represent military activities falling somewhere
between “war” and “peace.”
11. Notably, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, which is over 600 pages long and defines thousands of
terms, does not define the word “principle” nor the term “principles of
war.” Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, does state,
“The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of U.S. military
doctrine.” See U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint
Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1, 1995, p. A-1.
12. Glenn, p. 48. Glenn is quoting from an earlier work written by
Alger at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS.
13. Donn A. Starry, “The Principles of War,” Military Review,
September 1981, p. 5.
14. Some would argue Clausewitz, or Jomini, or both, might object to
the notion of codifying principles of war in a deterministic list such as
this. Others would argue these authors would allow the practice,
provided certain caveats accompany the list. Regardless, there is no
denying the list’s creation was heavily influenced by J. F. C. Fuller’s
thoughts on the subject, including his interpretation of the writings of
these two strategists. Much of Fuller’s matured thinking on the subject
was later summarized in his 1926 work, The Foundations of the Science
of War, London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1926, reprinted by U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College Press, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1993.
15. According to Glenn, the list disappeared after 1928 but
reemerged as a list of seven “general principles” for use during the
“conduct of war” in the U.S. Army’s 1939 FM 100-5, Tentative Field
Service Regulations, Operations. There was no list of principles in the
1941 FM 100-5; the reader was instead presented with several
“doctrines of combat”: ultimate objective, simple and direct plans and
methods, unity of effort, offensive action, concentration of superior
forces, surprise, and security. Then, in the 1949 FM 100-5, the currently
adopted list of principles emerged. Interestingly, only “maneuver” and
“unity of command” stand in the place of the original “movement” and
“cooperation,” respectively, found in the 1921 version. See Glenn, pp.
50-52. Lastly, Alger notes that “as the [U.S.] turned its attention from
the humiliating lessons learned in Southeast Asia, it briefly dropped the
‘principles’ from official doctrinal sources. But the ‘principles’ hastily

38

returned to U.S. doctrine in 1978 after just two years in limbo.” See
Alger, p. 169.
16. Starry, p. 5.
17. Australian military doctrine lists the principle of
“Administration” instead of this principle.
18. Primary source: National Defense University, The Joint Officers
Staff Guide 1997, Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, pp. 1-4. The
author modified the AFSC Publication 1 table to more correctly reflect
the Great Britain and Australian principle of “Economy of Effort” (the
AFSC Publication 1 Table lists it as “Economy of Force”). Further, Great
Britain’s previous principle of “administration” was replaced by the
principle of “sustainability” (neither was listed in AFSC Publication 1).
See JWP 0-01, p. A-8. See also: Doctrine Branch, Headquarters Training
Command (Australian Army), The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,
Georges Heights, New South Wales, Australia: Ventura Publisher,
1993, p. 25. This publication cites Australian Defense Force Publication,
(AFDP) 1, Doctrine, as its source for the Australian principles of war.
19. Alger, p. ix.
20. As General Starry rhetorically suggests, “Whether this reflects
the ultimate wisdom of their drafter, intellectual bankruptcy or some
other circumstance would be hard to say.” See Starry, p. 5.
21. These are but three of a plethora of contemporary books and
articles analyzing and recommending various changes to the existing
principles of war reflecting the long-standing yet healthy debate in the
literature. Other representative works include Barry R. Schneider’s
essay, “Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future,” found in the
book, Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Schneider
and Grinter, eds., which takes a contemporary view of the nine
principles and recommends adding four more: Simultaneity and Depth
of Attack, Logistics, Information Dominance, and Precision Targeting;
Edward Mann, “One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass Dead?”
Military Review, September 1993, pp. 33-41; Paul Katz, “The Additional
Principle of War,” Military Review, June 1987, pp. 36-45 (recommends
adding “behavior of the individual soldier” as a principle); and Thomas
B. Vaughn, “Morale: The 10th Principle of War?”, Military Review, May
1983, pp. 23-39.
22. Official U.S. military definitions of “strategic,” “operational,”
and “tactical” levels of war can be found in Joint Publication 1-02.

39

23. The authors state, “While the principles have been thoroughly
scrutinized at the tactical and operational levels of warfare, the
monograph of their applicability at the strategic level has been less
exhaustive.” See William T. Johnsen, et al., The Principles of War in the
21st Century: Strategic Considerations, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, September 1995, p. 1. That being said, JWP 0-01,
British Defence Doctrine, in its overview of the (very similar) British
principles of war, states,
[The principles of war] are especially relevant at the military
strategic level, where they establish a number of criteria
against which courses of action affecting the national interest,
including defence investment decisions and the planning of a
campaign, may be tested.
JWP 0-01 goes on to say, “The principles also have a direct application at
lower levels, providing guides to action.” See JWP 0-01, p. A-1.
24. See Johnsen, et al., p. 2. As support, the authors cite
Clausewitz’s assertion that “war at the strategic level is an intellectual
process.” The applicable passage on the page of the English translation
they cite actually attributes to Clausewitz this following statement: “We
can already guess how great a role intellectual powers play in the higher
forms of military genius.” See Clausewitz, p. 101. The author feels
compelled to make the following fairly obvious assertion that war is an
intellectual process at all levels. That being said, the point made by the
SSI authors is well-taken.
25. On the other hand, they did not suggest that the current list of
nine principles is immutable, written in stone. In an appendix the
authors described their conscious decision to take a “minimalist”
approach (similar to this author’s) and recommend incremental changes
within the existing framework. They did, however, describe in an
appendix the opposite, or “maximalist” approach, whereby “truly
radical alternatives” can and should be considered from time to time,
“even if only to reject them after thoughtful consideration.” See
Johnsen, et al., p. 35.
26. U.S. Joint capstone and keystone doctrine does not specifically
address differences in applicability at the various levels of war; i.e.,
Joint Publication 3-0 states “the principles of war guide warfighting at
the strategic, operational and tactical levels.” See Joint Publication 3-0,
p. A-1.
27. Though not central to this monograph, this author believes two
of SSI’s six modified “strategic” principles—unity of effort and

40

clarity—are more applicable and appropriate terms than unity of
command and simplicity, respectively, at all levels of war. Unity of
command, for example, may be necessary to ensure unity of effort, but in
all cases unity of effort is essential—not necessarily unity of command.
This may increasingly be the case in complex, interagency and
multinational operations (the Joint Publication 3-0 definition even
speaks to this). Similarly, simplicity may be the strategy to help ensure
clarity, but it is clarity—not simplicity—that is essential in all cases.
The increasing and unavoidable complexity of future operations may
obviate any attempt to satisfy the principle of “simplicity” when
considering the traditional meaning of the word (and this author
believes considering a word’s traditional meaning is a requisite
consideration to ensure a principle of war is effectively communicated).
In fact, attempts to “ensure simplicity” would be counterproductive in
some situations.
28. Both lists are codified in Joint doctrine (Joint Publication 3-0
lists both sets of principles, and Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine
for Military Operations Other Than War, lists the principles of
MOOTW); however, Glenn was addressing the issue at the U.S. Army
doctrinal level, primarily as relating to FM 100-5. See Joint Publication
3-0, pp. V-2 through V-4 and A-1 through A-3; U.S. Joint Staff, Joint
Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication
3-07, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 16, 1995,
pp. II-1 to II-8. The currently adopted principles of MOOTW are also
listed in other Service doctrinal manuals, for example, in FM 100-1, The
Army, and FM 100-23, Peace Operations.
29. This recommendation curiously appears to ignore the now
established hierarchical authority of Joint capstone/keystone
publications, implying it would be acceptable to make such a change to
principles of war in basic Service doctrine without an originating
modification to Joint capstone/keystone doctrine. This is more an
administrative issue that should not detract from the otherwise valid
points Glenn surfaces.
30. Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information
Age, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998.
31. Ibid., p. xii. Leonhard specifically uses the term “conflict” in
order to, as he says, “widen the scope of the book beyond a merely
military context,” since he
[perceives] that many of the points [discussed] . . . are
applicable to all aspects of human conflict: business, politics,
sports, social conflict . . . in some sense, even in love and

41

romance—a human sport built around the most sensual conflict
of all.
32. Ibid., p. 244.
33. See Ibid, p. 245. The author supports this approach as a more
reasoned manner in which to consider and discuss principles of
warfighting, vice accepting and adhering to principles as prescriptions.
However, the author also views the current nine principles as a
reasonable list from which to base such discussions. Leonhard’s
complete discarding of the existing nine principles, as will be discussed,
likely creates unintended and untenable consequences and can be
likened to “tossing the baby with the bathwater.”
34. Ibid., p. 252.
35. Joint Publication 1-02 defines “doctrine” as: “fundamental
principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their
actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgment in application.” See U.S. Joint Staff, DoD Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, as amended
through February 10, 1999, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, p. 140.
36. Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the
Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the
Early Twenty-First Century, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Fort Monroe,
VA: U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, August 1, 1994, p. 1-3.
37. Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, 10 U.S. Code, sec. 153, 1998.
38. David A. Sawyer, “The Joint Doctrine Development System,”
Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, p. 37.
39. This is not to imply Joint doctrine was nonexistent prior to the
GNA. Joint operations are as old as our country, and hence, attempts to
create effective Joint doctrine have been long-standing. The first formal
attempt appears to have been via the Army-Navy Board formed in 1903,
which in its first 17 years could only produce one manual, “Joint Army
and Navy Action in Coast Defense.” From this meager beginning, and
throughout the years prior to the GNA, formal Joint doctrine has
progressed variously, often under the paralyzing influence of Service
interests and parochialisms. See William C. Smith, The United States
Needs Joint Warfighting Doctrine, Monograph Project, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 5, 1988, pp. 4-14.

42

40. Well over 100 Joint doctrinal publications now exist where none
previously did. See U.S. Joint Staff, Compendium of Joint Doctrine
Publications, Joint Publication 1-01.1, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 25, 1995, p. A-1.
41. In the early 1990s, there were persistent concerns with the level
of understanding of Joint doctrine within the U.S. armed forces. See
John Boatman, “Spreading the Word,” Janes Defence Weekly, December
10, 1994, p. 19. There was also significant Service concern with General
Shalikashvili’s direction, in the aftermath of the 1994 friendly
Blackhawk helicopter shootdown in Iraq, to revise the prefaces to all
Joint Publications to state, “The guidance in this publication is
authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the
judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise” (emphasis added). The italicized caveat seems to have
sufficiently subdued Service concerns, permitting acceptance by the
Service communities. See John Cushman, “In Joint Doctrine: What are
Exceptional Circumstances?” United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 1995, p. 46-50. Also, consider the following passage in
1996:
The Joint doctrine development process is often maligned as
slow and unresponsive to user needs. Unfortunately, there is
some validity to that charge. In the haste to get Joint doctrine
to the field, the initial publications were little more than
reworked Service doctrine between purple covers. They were
created out of need, but many were redundant or should have
been published as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
See Joseph J. Redden, “Joint Doctrine: The Way Ahead,” Joint Force
Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, p. 10. Lastly, two members of the U.S. Army
War College Strategic Studies Institute posit that “difficulties in the
development and implementation of sound Joint doctrine have been
caused, in large measure, by the systemic gap in the existing strategic
planning process.” See Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell
Young, Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, p. 1.
42. Chairmen Powell, Shalikashvili, and now Shelton have all
recognized their role to shepherd this monumental change through the
inertia of past doctrinal practices. Creation of the Joint Warfighting
Center and U.S. Atlantic Command’s increased roles in Joint training
and Joint force integration reflect this focus. Results are beginning to
show. Lieutenant General Joseph Redden, previous commander of the
Joint Warfighting Center, describes (General Shalikashvili’s) mandate

43

“that the publications should be more readable and distributed more
quickly.” As a result,
the process of developing doctrinal Publications was reduced
from 48 to 23 months . . . writing groups comprised of
representatives of the Services, CINCs, and Joint Staff
directorates . . . draft a document that is as purple as possible,
reducing coordination time . . . The new publication format has
been widely accepted . . . distribution is made to the field and
fleet based on lists developed by the Services and CINCs.
See Redden, p. 10.
43. Examples of this are found in the introductions or prefaces to the
following basic Service doctrine documents: U.S. Army Field Manual
100-1 (FM 100-1), The Army, June 1994; Air Force Doctrine Document 1
(AFDD-1) Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997; Naval Doctrine
Publication 1, NDP-1, Naval Warfare, March 1994; and Marine Corps
Doctrinal Publication 1, MCDP-1, Warfighting, June 1997.
44. This is solely the author’s opinion, which tends to be a
middle-ground position. Opinion on this matter, between and among
officers, Services, and other groups, varies widely. Some believe the
Joint doctrine system is too constraining for the Services, stifling full
development of Service-born concepts, while others believe the Service
doctrines need to further conform to the Joint hierarchy.
45. Sawyer, p. 39.
46. There are currently only two Joint doctrine documents defined
as “capstone” doctrine, which is the highest level of basic, overarching
Joint doctrine. They are Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed
Forces, and Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. Joint
“keystone” doctrine documents are the next level of basic, overarching
documents categorized by functional field. There are currently six such
documents (Joint Publication 1-0, 2-0, etc.) for each of the six functional
fields. The Services do not use the terms “capstone” and “keystone” in
the same formalized and standardized manner; however, some make
use of the terms. To avoid any confusion, the term “basic” doctrine will
be used when describing any overarching Joint or Service doctrine, and
the terms “capstone” and “keystone” will be associated only with
overarching Joint doctrine.
47. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United
States, Joint Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, January 10, 1995, p. III-1.

44

48. Joint Publication 3-0, pp. II-1 and A-1 through A-3.
49. Ibid., p. A-1.
50. Namely, FM 100-1, The Army, AFDD-1, Air Force Basic
Doctrine, and NDP-1, Naval Warfare. Additionally, the principles of war
are variously discussed and cascaded throughout other Joint and
Service doctrine documents; for example, in Joint Publication 3-05,
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and in the Army’s foundational
FM 100-5, Operations.
51. Considering the DTLOMS environments is helpful because it
represents the U.S. Army’s attempt to cover all organizational domains
during the requirements determination process. By extension, the
DTLOMS review process is an excellent way to capture the totality of
organizational activities. Hence, the greater the influence on the
DTLOMS environments, the greater the influence on the organizational
culture. See Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, Requirements Determination,
TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, August 1, 1999, p. 5.
52. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung,
trans. Foreign Languages Press, Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1963, p. 78. Essay written in December 1936.
53. More precisely, it begins with a collective and consensual shift in
viewpoint by the organization’s senior leadership. Those leaders, in
turn, agree to change basic doctrine, as depicted in Figure 1.
54. The American Heritage Dictionary, Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1991, p. 513.
55. Sourced from several popular English dictionaries.
56. Provided, however, that “open-mindedness” is not permitted to
create, or evolve into, a state of indecisiveness or lack of direction. The
author confronted this concern by including the following carefully
worded “balancing” phrases in the definition: “while constantly focusing
on the objective,” as well as, “nor lose orientation,” and finally, “yet
never lose focus on the commander’s intent.”
57. As previously discussed, the U.S. military community currently
subscribes to two independent lists of principles—one addressing
principles of “war,” and one addressing principles of “operations other
than war.” Also as discussed, some have suggested merging the two
lists. The outcome of that debate is not important to this monograph.

45

However, this author believes the concept of flexibility is universally
applicable across the wide spectrum of military operations and should
therefore be incorporated in any list or lists of fundamental principles of
“military operations.”
58. Book of “Job” in The Holy Bible (The Oxford Self-Pronouncing
Bible, Authorized King James Version), London: Oxford University
Press, 1967, Chapter 6, Verse 25, p. 576.
59. See Johnsen, et al., p. 3. Most analyses of the American
principles of war place the principle of objective on a plane above all
other principles. Even so, there may be times whereby the objective itself
might need—or is—changing, and only the flexible leader is perceptive
enough to identify the need or the change.
60. Save, maybe, for the somewhat ethereal or abstract notions of
offensive spirit and initiative, or determination, or moral force. Those,
however, do not provide the intellectually broad, tangible, and objective
coverage of warfare that flexibility provides. Regardless, this debate
need not be resolved.
61. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., London:
Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 10, 43.
62. Essay by Peter Paret in Clausewitz, pp. 11-12.
63. T. Owen Jacobs, A Guide to the Strategic Leader Development
Inventory, Second Revision, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, n.d., p. 7.
64. Leonhard, p. 274.
65. Though, as was shown earlier, other major, industrialized
militaries have adopted the principle of flexibility; namely, Great
Britain and Australia. There are others as well.
66. Leonhard, pp. 274-275. To be completely fair, Leonhard’s second
point (regarding the conflict between principles) was as much a
complaint about the current structure of the nine principles as it was a
compelling argument for flexibility. However, Leonhard would also be
quick to support Clausewitz’s, as well as his own notion (see Chapter 14
of his book) of the duality of warfare, and that “nothing is ultimately
unopposed.” More succinctly, there is nothing fundamentally wrong
with the notion of principles opposing or conflicting with each other.
That idea, of course, argues for flexibility.
67. Starry, p. 2.

46

68. Katz, p. 38.
69. Joint Publication 3-0, p. A-2.
70. Great Britain, Canada, and Australia are three. In the 1950s, a
Canadian officer made a compelling argument for flexibility as one of
only six “true” principles, relegating the concepts of “movement” and
“mobility” (the two closest to maneuver) into a category he termed “a
bewildering list of other ‘principles’.” See K. C. Kennedy, “The Principles
of War,” Canadian Army Journal, November 1951, p. 72. While this
author agrees maneuver would more appropriately be a subset of
flexibility given a shorter list of principles more “condensed” or
“distilled” than the existing one, in the current framework, both
principles are essential.
71. Consider the following phrases taken from the these Joint
Publication 3-0 definitions of other principles: “exploit the initiative”
(objective), “at the [right] place and time to achieve decisive results”
(mass), “judicious employment and measured allocation” (economy of
force), “staff planning and understanding [the enemy]” and “prudent
risk management” (security), “speed in decisionmaking” (surprise), and
“greatly facilitate[s] mission execution in the stress, fatigue and other
complexities of modern combat” (simplicity). All of these can be
rationally connected to the proposed doctrinal definition of flexibility.
See Joint Publication 3-0, pp. A-1 to A-3.
72. Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Air Force Basic
Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Maxwell AFB, AL:
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, September 1997, pp. 23-24.
73. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Operations, U.S. Army
Field Manual 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
June 14, 1993, pp. 2-7, 2-9, and 9-2.
74. Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine
Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994,
p. 8.
75. U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint
Operations, Joint Publication 4-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, January 27, 1995, pp. II-1 to II-4. Additionally, Joint
Publication 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, describes
flexibility as one of the four Tenets of Mobilization. See Joint Staff, Joint
Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, Joint Publication 4-05,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 22, 1995, pp.
II-1 to II-6.

47

76. Though a receptiveness to influence is, on the other hand,
essential.
77. Gregory Foster, “Research, Writing and the Mind of the
Strategist,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996, pp. 112-113.
78. Joint Publication 3-0, p. A-1.
79. Williamson Murray, “The German Response to Victory in
Poland,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2, n.p.: Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1981, p. 2.
80. Hans Binnendijk, ed., Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging
Power for Peace, Washington, DC: National Defense University,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1998, p. 153.
81. David T. Twining, Beyond Multilateralism, Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1998, pp. ix-xii.
82. Specifically, these revolutions are: The Information Revolution,
The Socio-Biological Revolution, The Efficiency Revolution, and The
Revolution in Military Affairs. She goes on to note the “abundance of
contradictions” that this age of revolutions has already produced in
terms of attempting to define future warfare. See Claudia Kennedy, The
Age of Revolutions, Letort Paper, No. 3, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, March 1998, pp. 1-5.
83. Or, as Richard L. Kugler concludes from his 2-year RAND
National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) monograph, it will be an
increasingly dangerous world. See Richard L. Kugler, Toward a
Dangerous World—U.S. National Security Strategy for the Coming
Turbulence, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995, pp. xii-xxviii.
Even the title of the U.S. Army War College Autumn 1998 Parameters
article, “Radical Destabilizing Effects of New Technologies,” portends
an unruly future and seems to capture prevailing sentiment. See
Thomas K. Adams, “Radical Destabilizing Effects of New Technologies,”
Parameters, Autumn 1998, p. 99.
84. Schneider and Grinter, p. 3.
85. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1996.
86. Some, for example, charge that JV 2010 contributes little
original thought; others suggest it goes too far in trying to “coalesce” the
various Service perspectives, in essence stifling them. Some argue it
focuses too heavily on technical solutions. For example, see Frank G.

48

Hoffman, “Innovation Can Be Messy,” United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, January 1998, pp. 46-50. Many others, however, hail JV
2010 as a brilliant and forward-looking unifying document that both
releases and positively channels “tremendous energy once dedicated to
competing visions with little return,” as stated by Major General
Charles Link, USAF. See Charles D. Link, “21st Century Armed
Forces—Joint Vision 2010,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1996, pp.
69-73.
87. Shalikashvili, p. 19.
88. U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, Concept for Future Joint
Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Joint
Warfighting Center Publication, January 22, 1997.
89. For an overview of such efforts, see Benny G. Steagall, Adaptive
Joint Force Packaging, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks,
PA: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997.
90. For an overview of the EAF concept, see Bruce D. Callander,
“The New Expeditionary Force,” Air Force Magazine, September 1998,
pp. 54-56. Regarding U.S. Army emerging emphasis on tailorability and
modularity, see TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, p. 3-2.
91. This process is not without controversy. For example, see
William J. Toti, “It is Broken! Fix It!” Armed Forces Journal
International, April 1996, pp. 29-34. However, this author believes the
overall JWCA design is fundamentally sound and will mature into the
effective process originally envisioned. For an overview and assessment
of the JWCA process by its founder, Admiral William Owens, see
William A. Owens, “Understanding the JWCA Process: Bringing A
Better Joint Warfighting Perspective To Bear On Resource Allocation,”
Armed Forces Journal International, May 1996, p. 14. Also see William
A. Owens and James R. Blaker, “Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs,”
Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1996, pp. 37-40.
92. Letter to George Bainton, October 15, 1888. See Justin Kaplan,
ed., Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 16th Edition, Boston, MA: Little,
Brown and Company, 1992, p.527.

49

APPENDIX I
THE AMERICAN PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Below are the American Principles of War as listed and
described in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations. 1
OBJECTIVE:

•

The purpose of the objective is to direct every military
operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable objective.

•

The objective of combat operations is the destruction
of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and will to
fight. The objective of an operation other than war
might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too
must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must
directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the
purpose of the operation. Each operation must
contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that
do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

OFFENSIVE:

•

The purpose of offensive action is to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative.

•

Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way
to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive
operations are the means by which a military force
seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining
freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The
importance of offensive action is fundamentally true
across all levels of war.

51

MASS:

•

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of
combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive
results.

•

To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint
force capabilities where they will have decisive effect
in a short period of time. Mass must often be
sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects,
rather than concentrating forces, can enable even
numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results
and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

ECONOMY OF FORCE:

•

The purpose of economy of force is to allocate
minimum essential combat power to secondary
efforts.

•

Economy of force is the judicious employment and
distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of
available combat power to such tasks as limited
attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even
retrograde operations in order to achieve mass
elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

MANEUVER:

•

The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a
position of disadvantage through the flexible
application of combat power.

•

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the
enemy to secure or retain positional advantage,
usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery
of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering
force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance
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and thus also protects the friendly force. It
contributes materially in exploiting successes,
preserving freedom of action, and reducing
vulnerability by continually posing new problems for
the enemy.
UNITY OF COMMAND:

•

The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of
effort under one responsible commander for every
objective.

•

Unity of command means that all forces operate
under a single commander with the requisite
authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a
common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires
coordination and cooperation among all forces toward
a commonly recognized objective, although they are
not necessarily part of the same command structure.
In multinational and interagency operations, unity of
command may not be possible, but the requirement
for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of
effort—coordination through cooperation and
common interests—is an essential complement to
unity of command.

SECURITY:

•

The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy
to acquire unexpected advantage.

•

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing
friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or
surprise. Security results from the measures taken by
commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning
and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and
doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in
military operations. Application of this principle
includes prudent risk management, not undue
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caution. Protecting the force increases friendly
combat power and preserves freedom of action.
SURPRISE:

•

The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a
time or place or in a manner for which it is
unprepared.

•

Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of
combat power and thus achieve success well out of
proportion to the effort expended. Factors
contributing to surprise include speed in
decisionmaking, information sharing, and force
movement; effective intelligence; deception;
application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and
variations in tactics and methods of operation.

SIMPLICITY:

•

The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear,
uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure
thorough understanding.

•

Simplicity contributes to successful operations.
Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize
misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors
are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity
in plans allows better understanding and execution
planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of
expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the
stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern
combat and are especially critical to success in
combined operations.
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ENDNOTE - APPENDIX I
1. U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication
3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1,
1995, pp. A-1 through A-3.
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APPENDIX II
A Discussion of Robert Leonhard’s Book,
The Principles of War for the Information Age
Authors Johnsen, et al., made the following statement in
their 1995 SSI monograph on the principles of war: “In order
to revalidate continually the principles of war . . . it is
necessary to occasionally consider truly radical alternatives
. . .”1 Robert Leonhard’s provocative new work titled The
Principles of War for the Information Age 2 is one such
alternative deserving close review.
Leonhard, seemingly wearied with what he suggests is a
bankrupt intellectual framework of war principles, wipes
the slate clean, offering three new “laws of war” and seven
new “principles of war for the information age.” The book is
intriguing, and as Major General Robert Scales states in his
foreword,
Robert Leonhard has done all of us monographing future
warfare a great service by examining this issue in detail. His
arguments . . . confront long-accepted convictions. He
challenges us to strip away preconceptions and to reexamine
the principles of war in a new context.3

Leonhard’s laws and principles represent an excellent
list of arguments or categories of thinking (vice
prescriptions), as he describes them. This represents a
different lens through which principles of war can be
viewed. Leonhard would likely add that this lens is not only
different, but it is the right lens to use now and in the
evolving Information Age. He considers the current
principles of war a prescriptive and rearward-looking
American list; principles, he argues, which have lost any
applicability they may have once had.
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This author is not so sure, and this raises the very
pragmatic and important issue of utility. By virtue of the
78-year intellectual framework created by the codification
of the American principles, strong—and very
useful—organizational and cultural norms have been
established. For example, beyond their obvious and direct
tactical applications, the principles have proven extremely
useful as a retrospective tool in academic and literary
settings as a basis for analyzing wars, campaigns and
battles. 4 As an operational tool for the here-and-now, the
principles represent an excellent framework for evaluating
courses of action during campaign planning. 5 These are but
two examples. Beyond these instilled norms, the current list
has likely survived this long because it seems to target the
intellectual center of the military officer population, giving it
widest application. There is an obvious tradeoff here, but
this author believes it strikes a good balance. The principles
are not so prescriptive and rudimentary as to insult (e.g.,
“kill or be killed”), yet they are not in the “ether-zone” of
thought reserved for only the very brightest and most
insightful of military thinkers.
This author is concerned Leonhard’s work misses the
“utility” mark on both counts above (i.e., as a useful
organizational norm, and on the targeted intellectual level)
and should not be adopted by the U.S. Armed Forces—at
least not without further study. First, his laws and
principles are so completely descriptive (partly because he
focuses on the duality of each of the principles), that they
seem to create, without an attendant deeper analysis, an
almost paralyzing sense of neutrality—everything gets
“cancelled out.” Leonhard would likely counter that this is a
misinterpretation of his message—that the principles must
be presented as intellectual arguments, each with two sides,
to be truly valid. He is right—principles should be discussed
as arguments. But a certain “prescriptiveness,” which the
current set of principles carries, has proven over the years
an extremely useful guide in the heat of war planning—and
battle—when the human mind reaches for aids to organize,
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focus, and positively channel thoughts. Leonhard’s laws and
principles, on the other hand, are significantly more esoteric
and abstract than the current list—to the degree they would
likely lose the useful, wide applicability and demonstrated
acceptance of the current set of principles. In a sense, the
principle of simplicity (or clarity, as this author prefers) is
violated. This is not to say Leonhard’s work is without
value—quite the contrary. He brings fresh thought to an
admittedly stale discourse in the literature. His emphasis
on the humanness and the duality of warfare (though not
original) and his notion that principles should be treated as
arguments are particularly insightful. However, when
considering his proposal for formal codification and wide
adoption by the U.S. Armed Forces, its broad utility is
uncertain.
This gets back to this author’s pragmatic belief that an
evolutionary—not a revolutionary—approach to modifying
the principles is probably in order. By incorporating
flexibility within the current framework, the other nine
principles actually become more like Leonhard’s
“arguments,” because a flexible disposition, by definition,
does not permit any one principle to become prescriptive
dogma; each principle must be weighed against the
situation at hand. Further, such an approach preserves a
set of principles that have demonstrated their usefulness
throughout the wide spectrum of Industrial Age warfare. As
General Scales tactfully reminds the reader in the foreword
to Leonhard’s book, “much about warfare will remain true to
its past.”6 But probably most importantly, by preserving the
current, traditional framework of principles, the result will
be minimal stress on the organizational cultures (read,
minimum unintended consequences) while yielding
maximum benefit.
Leonhard certainly may be onto something, but his
proposed laws and principles, for now, seem best left with an
intellectual sub-set inside an otherwise broad,
multi-constituent population that relies on the adopted
principles of war. Incorporating flexibility within the
58

current framework of principles can be viewed as a more
“manageable,” yet still fundamentally important heading
change as the U.S. military moves into the 21st century.
ENDNOTES - APPENDIX II
1. This sentence ended, “even if only to reject them after thoughtful
consideration.” The SSI team was addressing two such alternatives,
which they called the “maximalist” approach and the “minimalist”
approach. The “maximalist” approach posits that “war has become so
complex that no single set of principles can apply to all of war’s
variations.” Conversely, the “minimalist” approach suggests that “the
existing principles of war can be further distilled.” See William T.
Johnsen, et al., The Principles of War in the 21 st Century: Strategic
Considerations, Carlisle Barraks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
September 1995, p. 35.
2. Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information
Age, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998.
3. Ibid., p. vii.
4. A recent example is Lieutenant Colonel William C. Bennett’s
analysis of Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) using the principles of
war. See William C. Bennett, “Just Cause and the Principles of War,”
Military Review, March 1991, p. 2.
5. For example, the nine principles of war are listed in the Theater
Analysis and Replanning Graphic Execution Toolkit (TARGET), a
computer-based JOPES planning tool used by the warfighting CINC
staffs as a basis for analyzing courses of action during crisis action
planning.
6. Leonhard, p. vi.
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